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Abstract
- FIRST DRAFT -
This paper discusses investments in transport infrastructure and incentives for commut-
ing taxes in a multiregion framework. Responsibilities of ￿scal treatment of commuting
expenses, public provision of road infrastructure and road tolls are distributed among
di⁄erent levels of government. The incentives governments face when wielding these
instruments, are discussed. Furthermore, the interactions between investment in trans-
port infrastructure and commuting subsidies is analysed. We identify incentives for
strategic and tax exporting behavior that might lead to underinvestment in transport
infrastructure. Finally, we show that the intensity of the strategic behavior is a⁄ected
by ￿rm ownership structure, the number of labor-supplying regions and the revenue-
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31 Introduction
Commuting is a pervasive phenomenon in urbanized areas nowadays. Many people travel to
work by car or by means of public transport. Agglomeration forces result in a higher con-
centration of economic activity. Together with residential structures, these spatial patterns
create employment centers that attract workers from surrounding cities, regions or countries.
In Belgium, for instance, the capital Brussels attracts nearly 600000 commuters on a daily ba-
sis from surrounding regions Flanders and Wallonia. Moreover, numerous countries stimulate
commuting by providing some sort of commuting subsidy, for instance by making commuting
costs income tax deductible or by heavily subsidizing public transport. In general, political
decisions on transportation issues are made by di⁄erent levels of government. For instance,
a city can decide on parking fees and tolls, the regional authorities on investments in roads
and the federal government holds responsibility for rail transport. This paper discusses some
aspects of transport policy in a federal state.
The relevant literature forms an overlap between two areas in economics. On the one
hand, the model that will be presented here draws upon urban economics literature, in which
spatial aspects, such as the location of ￿rms and residents, are crucial. Related central
features are agglomeration, congestion and environmental externalities. The reasons for a
commuting subsidy or a road toll usually build upon externalities, market imperfections and
pre-existing distortions. Optimal taxation has received quite some attention in this ￿eld.
Mirrlees (1972) discusses the role of commuting subsidies in the presence of environmental
externalities in the city. The trade-o⁄ between congestion and agglomeration e⁄ects that
an optimal road toll faces is considered by Arnott (2007). He models labor-leisure choice
explicitly, and individuals decide on the proportion of days to work. Graham and Van
Dender (2008) and Verhoef and Nijkamp (2003) discuss similar tradeo⁄s.
While road pricing can serve to internalize environmental and congestion externalities,
transport taxes can also have a negative e⁄ect on labor supply1 or labor force participation
(Parry and Bento 2001). Commuting subsidies may partially o⁄set these e⁄ects. In addi-
tion, they can be introduced to stimulate agglomeration externalities. Welfare e⁄ects of the
seemingly contradictory road tolling and commuting subsidies may therefore be superaddi-
tive in a spatial framework (Verhoef and Nijkamp 2003). These considerations result in some
literature in urban economics pointing out the ine¢ ciencies and creation of urban sprawl
induced by subsidizing transport (Brueckner 2005), while others illustrate that commuting
subsidies may improve welfare in a second-best framework (Wrede 2001, Wrede 2009). Wrede
1Gutierez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010), however, claim in an empirical paper that "changes in
labour supply are likely not fundamental to the discussion to what extent these policies [that a⁄ect commuting]
a⁄ect welfare".
4(2009) shows that commuting subsidies that countervail a distortive wage tax are e¢ ciency
enhancing if and only if labor supply is shifted from a less to a more productive area. Borck
and Wrede (2009) give a similar rationale for commuting subsidies. They present a model in
which workers, choosing place of residence and place of work simultaneously, generate urban-
ization externalities in production. If agglomeration rents are captured locally, commuters
do not get their share of these rents. In this setting, commuting subsidies may lead to a
￿rst-best solution.
On the other hand, the important insights in tax competition can be found in the literature
on ￿scal federalism, where di⁄erent government levels or regions a⁄ect each other￿ s budget
by choosing taxes and expenditures. An overview of the literature on tax competition in the
transport sector is presented by De Borger and Proost (2004).
Typically, a distinction is made between horizontal and vertical tax competition. Hori-
zontal tax competition occurs between governments at the same level. Several regions, states
or l￿nder in a federal country having the responsibility over some range of instruments could
be an example to bear in mind along the discussion. Tax competition occurs when di⁄er-
ent regions compete for a mobile tax base, e.g. mobile capital or labor. Taxes set by one
region then a⁄ect tax revenues of the other regions. For instance, a region can set lower
taxes on capital to attract ￿rms. Another tax externality is tax exporting, which describes
the attempt to shift taxes to non-residents. The fact that a region does not take the e⁄ects
on other regions into account when deciding on its tax schedule can introduce allocative
distortions and may result in overall e¢ ciency losses (Oates 1999). The same holds when
congestion, environmental or agglomeration externalities are not fully accounted for. How-
ever, some conditions have been set out under which tax competition could display e¢ ciency
enhancing features (see De Borger and Proost (2004) for a discussion). De Borger, Dunkerley
and Proost (2007) discuss a model with horizontal tax and capacity competition to show tax
exporting and underinvestment in transport capacity by the regions. De Borger et al. (2005)
study tax competition between countries in a network with parallel links. A distinction is
made between local and transit tra¢ c. The results suggest that cooperative setting of road
tolls leads to only small welfare gains compared to non-cooperative transit tolling.
Vertical ￿scal externalities describe the interaction between higher and lower level gov-
ernment tax policies and revenues. For instance in case of a shared tax base, the local
government might set taxes too high because the impact on federal government tax revenue
is ignored. The federal government could try to counterbalance the resulting ine¢ ciencies
with a set of taxes, subsidies and grants. Proost and Sen (2006) present a model in which
several government levels control di⁄erent transport pricing instruments. The potential e¢ -
ciency losses, estimated by comparing the case with multiple government levels to the social
5optimum, show limited detrimental welfare e⁄ects. Ubbels and Verhoef (2008) study vertical
competition between the region and city. Governments compete in road pricing and capacity
(as in De Borger, Dunkerley and Proost (2007) in a horizontal competition setting), which
may result in a strong tendency of tax exporting and possibly harmful e⁄ects for overall
welfare.
This paper develops a simple model, which incorporates productivity e⁄ects of labor
allocation decisions (i.e. commuting decisions). The impact of commuters on productivities
is also captured in Venables (2007), for instance, who discusses the bene￿ts of transport
investments in a general equilibrium framework with agglomeration externalities. Here, we
explore governmental competition and include strategic behavior of regional governments.
The next section introduces the model and the underlying assumptions. Section 3 derives
the ￿rst best allocation of workers and the optimal investments in transport. Subsequently,
in sections 4 and 5, we analyze decisions on transport policy made at the regional and
city level respectively. Section 6 introduces Nash competition between city and regional
government with transport investments as a strategic variable, whereas section 7 questions
what the impact is of modifying some assumptions. Before summarizing the ￿ndings in the
conclusion, a numerical example illustrates the model for two Belgian regions.
2 The model
The economic model has three main actors. First, individuals choose labor location, i.e.
whether to commute or not. For the sake of simplicity, place of residence is kept ￿xed.
Second, ￿rms demand labor in a perfectly competitive environment. Third, a (multi-level)
government in￿ uences commuting ￿ ows via its commuting policy. Initially, a model with only
two regions is considered. This simpli￿es the analysis and yet captures some basic intuitions.
In many realistic situations, the structure of commuting ￿ ows can be reduced to include
only a limited number of areas, especially when labor mobility is limited. We return to this
assumption in section 7.
Now consider individuals. Let N1 denote the number of homogeneous individuals that
live and work in region 1 (N2 for region 2). The number of people that reside in region 1 and
work in region 2, i.e. the commuters, is labeled N12. So, three types of individuals can be
distinguished: i = 1 for inhabitants of region 1 that work in their region of residence; i = 2
for people working and living in region 2; and i = 12 for residents of region 1 who commute
to region 2.
6Region 2 attracts commuters because of its higher productivity and wages. This set-up
can be regarded as region 2 being an urban area or a city, surrounded by a rural area or the
periphery, region 1. Equivalently, region 2 is the central business district (CBD) to which
a daily commuting ￿ ow is observed. The ￿xed total number of residents in region 1 equals
N = N1 + N12.
The number of individuals is su¢ ciently large, such that any individual takes prices and
wages as given. The economy is closed, there is no migration into the economy, the total
number of individuals is ￿xed and they all work. An individual of region 1 has the choice to
work in his region of residence or to commute to the other region. No distinction is made be-
tween transport modes and leisure trips are ignored. If a worker decides to commute, he faces
a ￿xed commuting cost c. This can include both time and monetary costs2. In the remainder
of the paper, the commuting costs are thought of as using up physical resources. Note that by
assuming the commuting cost c is independent of the number of commuters, congestion ex-
ternalities are not incorporated. Governments can invest in transport infrastructure, in order
to reduce the commuting costs. We will denote the level of these infrastructure investments
with   for the federal or regional level, and with ￿ for investments in transport in the city.
The costs associated with these investments are described by a cost function K( ) for the
federal or regional government - we assume they dispose of the same investment technology
- and by the function Kc(￿) for the city government.
Furthermore, assume an individual￿ s utility Ui(xi) depends only on the consumption of a
homogeneous good xi. This means there are no substitution possibilities on the consumption
side. Freight costs are ignored and as the good is homogeneous and there are many producers,
the price of the homogeneous good can be normalized to 1 in both regions. Consumers
cannot distinguish between goods produced in di⁄erent regions. One of the implications is
that consumers cannot opt to consume the product that is produced locally, which could be
interesting e.g. if the agent holds a pro￿t share in local ￿rms.
Next, consider the production side of the economy. Firms use homogeneous labor as the
only input. This implies there is no opportunity to substitute on the production side, ￿rms
are not concerned with their optimal input mix and the stock of capital is ￿xed. A higher
stock of capital in the urban area could then account for the higher productivity in this region.
In addition, a ￿rm pays its workers a uniform wage equal to their marginal product and a
distinction between low- and high-skilled workers is absent. This may be a useful distinction,
however, since a city￿ s labor demand might consist of a high share of skilled workers. The
allocation of skilled and unskilled workers across regions is therefore not discussed in this
2In fact, any disutility of commuting can be included in this commuting cost. Stutzer and Frey (2008),
for instance, report a lower subjective well-being of commuters.
7paper. An analysis of commuting policy in a setting with heterogeneous workers, including
redistributive impact of commuting subsidies, can be found in Borck and Wrede (2008).
Furthermore, ￿rms produce a single homogeneous consumption good. This rules out prod-
uct di⁄erentiation. All goods are of equal quality and regions cannot specialize in producing
a speci￿c good. Introducing product heterogeneity and ￿rm specialization would complicate
the analysis signi￿cantly.
Di⁄erent technologies are at ￿rms￿disposal in the di⁄erent regions: F1(N1) represents the
production function in region 1 and F2(N12 + N2) re￿ ects the technology in region 2. We
assume that region 2 is the more productive one, resulting in higher wages in region 2. This is
the reason why only commuting in one direction is discussed. The higher productivity could
be caused by some natural advantage or by agglomeration economies. There is extensive
evidence on the nature and sources of agglomeration economies, as discussed by Rosenthal
and Strange (2004). They claim that labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge
spillovers are important factors in explaining higher productivities in cities. In this paper,
however, ￿rms will not move towards more productive regions, as ￿rm location is assumed to
be ￿xed. Mobility is focused on workers, whereas ￿rms￿location decisions are not part of the
discussion here. Firms face decreasing returns to scale in both regions. Pro￿ts are assumed
to be paid out to regional shareholders, so they are a bene￿t to the region in which the ￿rm
is located. Only section 7.3 deviates from this assumption and discusses cross-border ￿rm
ownership. Later in the paper, speci￿c functional forms for the production functions in both
regions will be used to illustrate and clarify the impact of the commuting ￿ ow on pro￿ts and
wages. Linearly decreasing marginal products o⁄er a simple, albeit restrictive framework
to discuss the model implications. The major drawback of this modeling approach is the
absence of agglomeration externalities, that point to marginal productivities that increase
with the number of workers.
Figure 1 gives a graphical summary in a situation with constantly decreasing marginal
productivities in both regions, whereas table 1 summarizes the main variables used in rest of
the paper.
8Figure 1: Model representation with constantly decreasing marginal productivities.
Variable Explanation
i Region i = 1;2
N Total number of people living in region 1
Ni Number of people working and living in region i
N12 Number of commuters from region 1 to region 2
c Commuting cost
Fi Production in region i
F 0
i Marginal product in region i
 , ￿ Investments in transport infrastructure
K(c) Transport infrastructure investment cost (in region 2, the city)
￿i Pro￿ts in region i
t Labor tax rate
s Commuting costs subsidy rate
W(i) (Regional) welfare
Table 1: Model variables
93 Federal government in control
Before we move to regionalized policies, we discuss the e¢ cient outcome for the federation
as a whole. The results obtained here will serve as a benchmark. First, we assume that
the government can simply choose the number of commuters. Next, we investigate optimal
transport policy decisions when individuals are free to choose their job location.
3.1 Social optimum
This section derives the labor allocation and investment in transport infrastructure in a ￿rst
best framework. The welfare maximizing social planner can decide on the optimal allocation
of workers over the two regions and the level of transport investments. Since the utility of
individuals only depends on consumption, the social planner maximizes the total production,




W = F1 + F2 ￿ (c ￿  )N12 ￿ K (1)
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to the number of commuters N12 and the level of










Condition (2) states that an e¢ cient labor allocation implies that the gap between mar-
ginal products in both regions equals the commuting cost (which can be decreasing through
investment). Expression (3) simply states that the marginal bene￿t of lowering transport
costs should equal marginal costs of investing. If one assumes linearly decreasing marginal
products in both regions,
F
0
1 = a1 ￿ b1N1 (4)
F
0
2 = a2 ￿ b2(N2 + N12), (5)
a1;a2;b1;b2 > 0, and increasing marginal cost of infrastructure investment
K( ) = k  + l 
2 (6)
10with k;l > 0, we obtain an explicit expression for the optimal number of commuters. The




(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c +   + Nb1 ￿ N2b2) (7)
N12 = k + l  (8)
From expression (7) we see that the optimal number of commuters is increasing in the dif-
ference of marginal products and decreasing in transport costs. The number of commuters
increases with transport investments. Solving this system of equations, we ￿nd explicit ex-
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l(b1 + b2) ￿ 1
(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2 ￿ k(b1 + b2)) (10)
Unsurprisingly, this last expression shows that the optimal investment level will be higher if
the cost parameters k and l are lower. We make two important assumptions. First, we assume
that the optimal number of commuters is positive, even without transport investments: a2￿
a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2 > 0. Secondly, the parameters of the investment cost function are such
that  
￿ is positive. The functional forms (4), (5) and (6) will be used throughout the paper.
3.2 Attaining ￿rst best under free movement of workers
Instead of the social planner deciding directly on the number of commuters, we now let
indiviuals choose their location of work. Assume there is an exogenous labor tax t and that
workers are paid their marginal product. Furthermore, there is a perfectly competitive labor
market, such that workers are paid there marginal product. In this section, the government
does not allocate workers to regions, but individuals decide where to work. Place of residence
is assumed to be exogenous and ￿xed. We then have a new equilibrium condition (the
investment condition, (3), does not change):
(1 ￿ t)F
0
1 = (1 ￿ t)F
0
2 ￿ (1 ￿ s)(c ￿  ) (11)
Expression (11) de￿nes the spatial equilibrium and states that commuting will equalize net








(c ￿  ) (12)
This shows that the combination of commuting costs and labor taxation distorts labor
location decisions. The federal government can make commuting expenses tax deductible,
i.e. s = t, to correct the distortion in the labor market. This allows to achieve the e¢ cient,
￿rst best outcome. Expression (12) then simply reduces to equation (2), such that an e¢ cient
spatial distribution of labor is guaranteed. Decisions on infrastructure investments remain
unchanged. Non-distortionary lump sum taxes instead of labor taxation would result in an
optimal commuting subsidy of s = 0. In conclusion, the federal government￿ s incentives
for making commuting expenses tax deductible are derived from correcting the pre-existing
distortion induced by the combination of labor taxes and commuting costs.
124 Strategic behavior of regional government
We now shift the responsibility of transport decisions to the government of the peripheral
region. First we discuss strategic incentives in transportation policy in depth. Afterwards, we
include a second policy instrument and amplify the analysis to include labor tax distortions.
4.1 Regional transport investment
This section analyzes in detail, in a simpli￿ed setting, whether the regional government has
incentives for strategic behavior that would lead to over- or underinvestment in infrastructure.
In order to do so, we regionalize the decisions on transport infrastructure investment   and
assume that the federal government continues to make commuting costs tax deductible, s = t.
We abandon the latter assumption in the next section. The full deductibility of commuting
expenses cancels out the labor tax distortion. We also assume here that the region does
not have the opportunity to in￿ uence commuting ￿ ows through commuting subsidies. For
the sake of clarity, we include all arguments in the notation in this section. The objective
function of the government of region 1, when maximizing welfare of its residents, takes local
pro￿ts, incomes of its residents and investment costs into account:
Max
 
















Note that this objective function does not include regional government revenue and thus
assumes a "juste retour" distribution of federal tax revenue, i.e. every region receives exactly
the amount of taxes paid by its residents. Therefore tax revenue is not included in the
objective function, since this is just a transfer from a region￿ s residents to its government3.

















If region 1, the peripheral region, perceives its position on the labor market in region
2, the city, as dominant, a strategic e⁄ect appears. To see where the strategic concerns
3Similarly, we could have assumed that the regional government levies lump sum taxes to ￿nance its
investments. The two assumptions only di⁄er in government budget constraints.
13of the regional government stem from, one can disentangle the strategic e⁄ect into three
components. Firstly, the number of commuters has an impact on pro￿ts in region 1. This
is re￿ ected by the term
@￿1(N12( ))
@N12( ) . Secondly, there will be an e⁄ect on wages in region 1,
which is captured by
@2F1(N12( ))
@N12( )2 . Thirdly, the city wages will be a⁄ected by the number of
commuters. These wages are relevant for the regional government since they are also paid out
to individuals that reside in region 1 but work in the city. This e⁄ect shows up in
@2F2(N12( ))
@N12( )2 .
If one assumes linearly decreasing marginal products in both regions, as in (4) and (5),
the ￿rst two components cancel each other out, which implies a redistribution of income











This shows that the investment level will now be lower than in the social optimum4. The
marginal bene￿ts of investing, on the left-hand side of (15), are reduced. Due to the strategic
e⁄ect, region 1 will invest less in transport infrastructure. This will restrict the number of
commuters but will increase their wage. As a result, the investment cost K( ) will also be
lower. The decreased commuting ￿ ow is welfare-reducing for region 2 and for the federation
as a whole. The distinct e⁄ects are shown in detail in ￿gure 2 and table 2.
4See appendix A.
14Figure 2: Welfare e⁄ects of a restricted number of commuters.
Region 1 will see an increase of local pro￿ts and wages of commuters. A lower number
of commuters implies more people working in region 1, which will decrease local marginal
products and wages. The impact on welfare in the city, region 2, is unambiguously negative.
The loss in pro￿ts is larger than the income gain of city residents. Total welfare in the
economy is decreased by the triangles ACP and BOD.
Region 1 Region 2 Total
Pro￿ts +EBDF -ACIJ +EBDF - ACIJ
Real income -EODF +KLMO +GHIJ -EODF + KLMO + GHIJ
Total -BOD +KLMO -ACGH -ACP - BOD
Table 2: Welfare e⁄ects of limiting the number of commuters
4.2 Regional transport investment and commuting subsidy when
labor is taxed
We now derive optimal decisions of the regional government in wider framework. First
we obtain analytical results in this setting. The next subsections discuss di⁄erent e⁄ects
15separately. Assume there is a regional labor tax t1 < 1. The government of region 1 then
























(a2 ￿ a1 ￿
1 ￿ s1
1 ￿ t1
(c ￿  ) + b1N ￿ b2N2) (17)
The regional government can now subsidize commuting at a rate of s1. Setting the ￿rst




(c ￿  )(b1 + 2b2)
(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c +   + Nb1 ￿ N2b2)(1 ￿ t1) + t1 (18)
To make a clear case, the e⁄ects embodied by this expression will be analyzed step by
step. First we ignore transport investments. Next, the additional interactions with pre-
existing labor market distortions are included when we replace lump sum taxation by a tax
on labor. Finally, transport investments are added to the analysis.
4.2.1 Lump sum taxation and only commuting subsidies
If we assume lump sum taxation is possible (set t1 = 0 in equation (18) to cancel out the labor
tax distortion), we can isolate the strategic e⁄ect. The expression for the optimal commuting






(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2). (19)
Under the assumptions made in section 3.1, sstrat
1 < 0 and the government taxes com-






(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2),
will be restricted by the regional government. We can compare with expression (7) (with
  = 0) to see that this is indeed the case. Whereas an e¢ ciency-preserving social planner
would set commuting subsidies equal to 0, the regional government limits the number of
commuters by levying a tax on commuting. This will cause an increase of wages of commuters.
164.2.2 Labor taxation and commuting subsidies
We keep   = 0, but consider the interaction with a regional labor tax t1. This section
shows that whether the regional government sets a commuting tax or a subsidy depends on
two countervailing forces. Correcting the labor tax distortion asks for a subsidy, whereas
strategic reasons provide an incentive for a commuting tax or an underinvestment in road or
rail infrastructure, for instance. The trade-o⁄ can be shown more explicitly. In particular,

















The left-hand side captures the strategic e⁄ect. The right-hand side shows the distortion
caused by the taxation of labor. With t1 < 1, the commuting subsidy will not fully cover the
commuting expenses (s1 < t1). Whereas e¢ ciency concerns ask for a complete deductibility
of commuting expenses, as discussed in section 3.2, strategic motives will prevent the regional
government from setting s1 = t1. Again, this reduces the number of commuters compared to
the social planner outcome.
4.2.3 Labor taxation, transport investments and commuting subsidies
Now add transport investments as a second instrument of transport policy. We then obtain
the full expression given by (18). The marginal bene￿t of investing in infrastructure depends
on the number of commuters. Since the trade-o⁄in previous subsection results in a restricted
number of commuters, the marginal bene￿t of infrastructure investments will be reduced.
Therefore, the level of these investments will be lower than socially optimal. Note that the
optimal s1 is decreasing in  . This means that a higher transport investment will bring
about a higher tax on commuters. This makes sense: as transport costs are reduced, more
people choose to commute. But to keep wages of commuters high, the commuting should be
restricted. In short, the government invests to reduce the commuting costs and limits the
commuting ￿ ow by setting a tax on commuting.
5See appendix B for more details.
175 Strategic behavior of city government
The previous section supposed that region 1 was a dominant supplier of labor in the city.
This section turns that assumption around and analyses the situation in which the city is a
dominant player on the demand side of the labor market. In case of regional labor taxes, the
commuting tax or subsidy is a neutral transfer in the eyes of the government of region 1. In
fact, the regional government has contradictory objectives when transportation investments
are added as a policy instrument. Reducing transport costs, on the one hand, and thereby
increasing the number of commuters, is bene￿cial because transport costs are a loss for its
commuters. On the other hand, strategic arguments would restrict the number of commuters,
for instance through lower investments in infrastructure or by pricing commuting. These two
arguments in￿ uence the commuting ￿ ow in opposite directions.
For region 2, the city, the situation is di⁄erent. In principle (under the assumptions
made), the city would prefer as much commuting in￿ ow as possible, since this causes an
increase in local pro￿ts that overcompensates the local income losses (recall ￿gure 2 and
table 2). The idea to restrict the number of commuters thus has a di⁄erent origin: taxing
commuters gives an extra government income. This reasoning suggests that the city may
have an incentive to invest strongly in transport infrastructure - in order to keep the number
of commuters high - in combination with a high tax on commuters - to increase government
revenue from tax exporting. We show that the city government may have an incentive for
tax exporting and study the interaction between transport policy instruments.
5.1 Transport investments and commuting taxes at city level
Consider transport investments (denoted here by ￿) and commuting taxes s2 (s2 < 0) at the
city level. Assume the city has the following costs associated with investments in transport:
Kc(￿) = m￿ + n￿
2,
m;n > 0. The city government then has an incentive to set high taxes on commuters and
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However, a high investment reduces tax income per commuter, since we express the tax on
the basis of the commuting cost: (1 ￿ s2)(c ￿ ￿). Note that, in contrast with the objective
18function of region 1, the tax revenue is taken into account. The ￿rst order condition with




b1 ￿ t(b1 + b2)
2b1 + b2 ￿ 2t(b1 + b2)
((a2 ￿ a1 + Nb1 ￿ N2b2)(1 ￿ t) ￿ c + ￿)
We will set t = 0 in the rest of this section to simplify the analysis. For now, remark two
e⁄ects. First, note that this is indeed a tax for   = 0. Second, the expression above shows
that city will set a higher tax on commuters when the level of transport investments is higher.



















= m + n￿ (20)
Marginal bene￿t of investing in infrastructure, on the left-hand side of expression (20), now
depends on three factors. We discuss these in turn.
Term (1) shows that an investment in transport also lowers the tax per commuter, since
this is s2(c￿￿). So if transport costs are reduced by one unit, the net bene￿t for commuters
is only (1 ￿ s2) units. Therefore, the commuting subsidy reduces the impact transport
investments on commuting ￿ ow.
Term (2) is the marginal bene￿t of investing in transport infrastructure if the city does not
have the possibility to tax or subsidize commuters, s2 = 0. The reason for the city to invest
in infrastructure is not to reduce transport costs (these are incurred by commuters), but just
to increase commuting, which drives down local wages and raises the level of production and
pro￿ts in the city. We see that the investments will be lower than socially optimal (assuming
the same cost structure of investments, k = m and l = n), but it makes more sense to stress
the di⁄erence in incentives. Comparing with (15) shows that the marginal bene￿t for the
federation equals the sum of marginal bene￿ts of the region and the city.
Term (3) enters the ￿rst order condition because a higher level of investments causes
more workers to commute, thereby also increasing the tax revenues. Therefore, this term
represents the tax exporting behavior. It depends on the size of the subsidy (numerator)
and how the number of commuters is a⁄ected by an investment in transport (denominator,
together with term (1)). Note that s2 < 0, such that the tax revenues are included as an
additional marginal bene￿t of infrastructure investment.
196 Nash competition in transport invesments
This section looks into Nash competition between the regional and the city government
when both can invest in transport infrastructure. We ignore commuting subsidies or taxes




(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c +   + ￿ + Nb1 ￿ N2b2)
From expressions (15) and (20) (with s2 = 0) we get the optimal investment rules:
b1
b1 + b2
N12 = k + l 
b2
b1 + b2
N12 = m + n￿
Both these reaction curves are increasing in the level of infrastructure investment from the
other region. The intuition is the following. When the city invests more in transport in-
frastructure, more workers will commute. More commuters implies more individuals who
bene￿t from a reduction in transport costs. Therefore the marginal bene￿t of investment
will be higher for region 1. To compare the total level of investments with the social planner
outcome of section 3.1, we assume that both the region as the city have the same costs of
investing in transport. Solving for   and ￿, with k = m and l = n, and summing to obtain
the total level of investments, we get6
  + ￿ =
1
l(b1 + b2) ￿ 1
(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2 ￿ 2k(b1 + b2))
The total investment in transport is lower than in the social planner case. This can be seen
by comparing with expression (10). In conclusion, the outcome of the Nash competition in




In this section, we relax or alter some of the assumptions. First, we include a third region.
Next, we discuss the impact of revenue sharing of federal taxes. The ￿nal assumption we
change is that pro￿ts are captured locally.
7.1 Three regions
This section discusses the e⁄ects of Cournot competition among governments on the labor
market in the city or region 2. Consider a third region with M inhabitants. The number of
individuals that live and work in this region is denoted N3. Productivity and wages in this
region are lower than in region 2, so workers have an incentive to commute to this region. N32
workers will do so. If region 3 is also a dominant supplier of labor in region 2, its government
will have an incentive to set a tax on commuting, as discussed for region 1. Assume lump
sum taxation and no investments in transport. The inclusion of a third region, that also
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Because region 1 is no longer the only supplier of labor in the city, its position is now less
dominant. If the government of region 1 decides to reduce the number of commuters to keep
wages in the city high, then an increased commuting ￿ ow from region 2 will (partially) o⁄set
the desired e⁄ect. Therefore, region 1 has a weaker incentive to set commuting taxes.
7.2 Revenue sharing mechanisms and labor tax schemes
Assume there is a federal labor tax and consider a framework with only two regions. De￿ne
￿1 as the share of federal tax revenue that goes to region 1 (0 < ￿1 < 1). Consider the
case where the lower level government decides on the commuting tax and the investments
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7The derivation can be found in appendix D.
21where the last two lines represent region 1￿ s share of federal tax revenues and its taxes paid,
respectively. These no longer cancel each other out as is the case with a regional labor (or
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An analysis of this objective function is enough to understand the nature of the outcome.
We distinguish four terms.
(1): Regional pro￿ts enter the objective function as before;
(2) A lower weight is given to real income of residents of region 1, since 1 ￿ t + ￿1t < 1;
(3): Income of residents of region 2 enters the objective function with a weight of ￿1t > 0;
(4): Commuting and investment cost are subtracted, as before.
Because higher income in region 2 increases the value of tax revenue redistributed to
region 1, this region will now attach a weight to income in region 2. Furthermore, a lower
weight is attached to income of its own residents. We might therefore be inclined to say
that this situation will drive the outcome towards the social optimum. However, consider
the welfare e⁄ects displayed in table 2. The impact of restricting the number of commuters
on real income of region 1 is given by area ￿EODF + KLMO. This area is now given a
lower weight. Note that this e⁄ect might be negative. A higher weight is now given to the
income e⁄ect in region 2, which is positive (+GHIJ). Therefore, the sharing rule for the
federal labor tax revenues might even intensify the strategic behavior of region 1.
7.3 Ownership structure or pro￿t taxes
A similar reasoning can be made for di⁄erent ownership structures. Until now, ￿rm owner-
ship was assumed to be local, i.e. local ￿rms were owned by local residents. This section
assumes that pro￿t shares are spread across jurisdictional borders. The assumption that each
individual owns only a negligible share of pro￿ts can still be made. Residents of region 1 now
get a part of the pro￿t made in region 2, and vice versa. Denote by ￿1 the share of pro￿ts
of ￿rms in region 1 owned by residents of region 1 (0 < ￿1 < 1). Similarly, let ￿1 be the
pro￿t share of region 1 inhabitants in pro￿ts of ￿rms in region 2 (0 < ￿1 < 1). The objective






















share in pro￿ts region 2
(23)
An analysis of expression (23) reveals that local pro￿ts get a lower weight in the regional
welfare function (￿1 < 1) and pro￿ts made in the city now enter the objective function with
a positive weight (￿1 > 0). Restricting the number of commuters a⁄ects pro￿ts in region 1
positively and pro￿ts in region 2 negatively (see table 2). A clear conclusion can be drawn:
since a local government now cares less about pro￿ts on its own territory and more about
pro￿ts made in the other region, the outcome will be closer to the social optimum.
238 Numerical example for Belgium
In this section, the model is calibrated such that the outcome re￿ ects a realistic situation. We
use Belgium as an example. Brussels serves as a large employment center, attracting many
workers from the regions of Flanders and Wallonia, North and South of Brussels respectively.
To illustrate some of the e⁄ects discussed in the analytical part of the paper, we restrict
the example to include only the capital of Brussels and the region of Flanders. Proost and
Sen (2006) adopt a transport model to estimate the potential welfare losses when pricing
instruments are controlled by di⁄erent levels of government. Their application on Brussels
yields only limited overall e¢ ciency losses compared to the situation where there is only one
government level.
Several hypothetical situations will be analyzed for the simple model with two regions
and without transport investments. First, the social planner outcome will be calculated and
will serve as a benchmark for comparison. E¢ ciency measures will compare welfare levels
with this social planner result. Next, we discuss a situation where Flanders limits the number
of commuters8. Subsequently, Brussels acts as a strategic player on the demand side of the
labor market and sets a commuting tax.
To stay in line with the notation used before and with the realistic picture in Belgium, we
denote Flanders as region 1 and Brussels as region 2. Residents of Flanders can commute to
Brussels (N12) or work in the region of Flanders (N1). In the model equilibrium, net wages
of all Flemish people are equalized, but there is a gap between wages in Flanders and wages
in Brussels. This gap is indeed what is observed in reality: the average gross wage disparity
was about 17% in 2007. Note that this is partially due to di⁄erences in skill composition of
the labor force. The data presented in table 3 will be used for the calibration.
Table 3: Data used for calibration
Average Gross monthly wage in Flanders 2796C =







￿ Number of people in thousands.
8Either directly or via commuting taxes, which was shown to be equivalent.
24The data on gross average regional wages, provided by Statistics Belgium9, is dated
October 2007. These wages concern full-time workers only. Numbers of workers in each
region and number of commuters are based on the latest available Belgian Census Data10,
dating back from 2001. Reports of the Flemish Government11 provide a discussion of the
data on commuting available in this Census Data. The numbers used are those for paid
workers (excluding self-employed workers). We de￿ne the commuting cost as the di⁄erence
between gross wages in both regions.
Let us turn to the calibration procedure. We need values for the parameters of the
production functions (a1, b1, a2, b2), for the number of individuals of each type (N1, N12,
N2) and for the commuting cost c. With the data presented in table 3 and the assumption
of linearly decreasing marginal products, we only need the slopes b1 and b2 to calibrate the
model. We derive these for a range of labor demand elasticities. Assuming a competitive
labor market, workers are paid their marginal product. Denoting by w1 and w2 the gross
wages in Flanders and Brussels respectively, we get:
w1 = F
0
1 = a1 ￿ b1N1
w2 = F
0
2 = a2 ￿ b2(N12 + N2)
Note that gross average wages are used in the calibration. Using gross wages means we
implicitly assume that the labor tax revenue is redistributed to the regions. The use of
average wages means we neglect the di⁄erences in skill composition of the labor force in the
two regions. Taking these into account might reduce the wage gap. From these expressions
we can write the number of workers in a region as a function of the wage, expressing labor
demand. For instance, for region 1 we obtain the labor demand LD1 = ￿
w1￿a1
b1 , with partial
derivative
@LD1
@w1 = ￿ 1









N1. For di⁄erent values of labor demand elasticity, we then obtain di⁄erent values for




N1. We let this elasticity vary from -0.2 to -0.8. Similar calculations are done
to obtain values for b2. In the results presented here, we assume labor demand elasticities
are the same in Brussels and in Flanders, so we can write "LD. Letting the absolute value
of labor demand elasticity in one region rise relative to the other region will slightly change
the results in the bene￿t of the former region. Tables 4 and 5 show welfare changes (￿) in
Brussels and Flanders in the di⁄erent scenarios. The last column (E¢ ciency) compares with
the social optimum.
9http://statbel.fgov.be/nl/statistieken/cijfers/arbeid_leven/lonen/maandloon/index.jsp
10De Socio-Economische Enquete (SEE) / L￿ EnquŒte Socio-Economique (ESE) 2001.
11https://www.werk.be/ and http://economie.fgov.be/nl/binaries/monogra￿e%20Pendel_tcm325-
34227.pdf
25Table 4: Flanders sets number of commuters￿
"LD % ￿ welfare Flanders % ￿ Welfare Brussels E¢ ciency (%)
-0,2 +2,36 -16,21 98,95
-0,4 +1,80 -13,97 99,18
-0,5 +1,61 -13,07 99,26
-0,6 +1,46 -12,28 99,33
-0,8 +1,22 -10,95 99,43
￿ Number of commuters = 130423.
Table 4 presents the situation where Flanders behaves strategically by restricting the
number of commuters. This number drops from 239000 to 130423. When labor demand is
rather inelastic, "LD = ￿0:2, Flanders can increase the welfare of its residents with 2.36%.
Brussels would then face a signi￿cant welfare decrease of 16.21%. The overall welfare level
is only slightly reduced to about 99% of the e¢ cient level. For more elastic labor demands,
the e⁄ects become smaller. The overall e¢ ciency loss is smaller than 0.6% for "LD = ￿0:8.
Table 5: Brussels sets commuting tax￿
"LD % ￿ welfare Flanders % ￿ Welfare Brussels E¢ ciency (%)
-0,2 -0,28 +0,67 99,90
-0,4 -0,21 +0,57 99,92
-0,5 -0,19 +0,54 99,93
-0,6 -0,17 +0,50 99,93
-0,8 -0,14 +0,45 99,94
￿ Number of commuters = 204711.
The situation were Brussels taxes commuters is shown in table 5. A small welfare increase
for Brussels goes at the cost of a decreasing welfare level in Flanders. Overall welfare losses
seem to be rather unimportant.
It is important to remark that the numerical example is presented for illustrative purposes.
It shows the e⁄ects derived theoretically and gives an idea on the size of these e⁄ects. Note
that the commuting taxes were not restricted here to values between -1 and 1 (i.e. a fraction
of commuting costs). On the contrary, the highest tax in this example was about ten times
the commuting cost (in the case where "LD = ￿0:2 and Flanders is the only region to set a
tax).
269 Conclusions
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a strategic aspect in commuting
policy in a federation with a limited number of regions. Whereas traditional arguments for
road pricing rest upon externalities, e.g. congestion or pollution, this paper presents strate-
gic arguments in regional government competition as a motive for a level of infrastructure
investments that is suboptimal from the federal point of view.
In the framework presented in this paper, a region that ￿ exports labor￿behaves strate-
gically by restricting the number of people that work in the other region, either by taxing
commuters or by investing less in infrastructure. If less people commute because of a commut-
ing tax, the marginal bene￿t of investing in transport infrastructure will be lower. Therefore,
taxing commuters also results in lower transport investments. The urban area or city that
attracts commuters might also bene￿t from taxing commuters. The relevant trade-o⁄, in this
case, is between tax revenue and pro￿t losses.
However, there might be in￿ uences that attenuate the strategic e⁄ect. Three factors are
considered. Firstly, a third region can be introduced. When this region also supplies labor to
the same city or central business district, the market power of the dominant labor supplier
diminishes. This will result in a lower commuting tax and a higher investment level of the
region that was previously the dominant supplier of labor. Secondly, an exogenous sharing
rule for the redistribution of federal labor tax proceeds introduces interdependencies between
regions￿government revenues. Finally, when ￿rm ownership is spread across the federation,
the incentive for restricting the number of commuters is reduced.
The authors wish to stress that this version of the paper is work in progress. In the
near future, we hope to analyze how the federal government can correct incentive structures
through mechanism design. Furthermore, we would like to explore vertical tax competition in
this framework. Also, future research could include agglomeration or congestion externalities.
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29Appendix
A Regional transport investments
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(b1 (a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2) ￿ k (b1 + b2)
2).
We then have the following number of commuters
N12 =
b1 + b2
(b1 + b2)2 ￿
b1
l








(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c + Nb1 ￿ N2b2)(1 ￿ t1) + t1 (24)
= (1 ￿ t1)s
strat
1 + t1 = s
strat




1 is given by expression (19). Given that sstrat
1 < 0, s1 is now less negative than
sstrat
1 . Another relevant comparison can be made, namely with the social planner outcome
of section 3.1. There the outcome was s = t. Region 1 now behaves strategically and sets a
lower subsidy than the labor tax rate:
s
strat
1 + t1(1 ￿ s
strat






() t1 < 1,
which is the case under the assumptions made (labor cannot be taxed at more than
100%). So we know the regional government sets the commuting tax lower than in the case
with lump sum taxes, and provides a lower commuting subsidy than in the federal social
planner parallel. This situation can result in a lower tax or even a subsidy. The following
30proposition sheds some light on this issue:
Proposition 1 In a setting with a regional labor tax and commuting policy (commuting tax
or subsidy; no transport investments), the regional government provides a commuting subsidy
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C Nash competition in investments




(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c +   + ￿ + Nb1 ￿ N2b2) (26)
The reaction functions:
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l(b1 + b2)2 ￿ b1
(27)
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n(b1 + b2)2 ￿ b2
(a2 ￿ a1 ￿ c +   + Nb1 ￿ N2b2) ￿
m(b1 + b2)2
n(b1 + b2)2 ￿ b2
(28)
Now impose m = k and n = l. Solving then gives:
￿ = ￿ 1
l2b2
1+l2b2
2￿lb1￿lb2+2l2b1b2 (￿kb1 + kb2 + lN2b2
2 + clb2 + la1b2 ￿ la2b2 + klb2
1 + klb2
2 ￿ Nlb1b2 + 2klb1b2)
31  = ￿ 1
l2b2
1+l2b2
2￿lb1￿lb2+2l2b1b2 (kb1 ￿ kb2 + clb1 + la1b1 ￿ la2b1 ￿ Nlb2
1 + klb2
1 + klb2
2 + 2klb1b2 + lN2b1b2)
  + ￿ = 1









(a2 ￿ a3 ￿ c(1 ￿ s3) + Nb3 ￿ b2 (N2 + N12)) (30)
The steps taken to get an expression for the optimal commuting tax are as follows. Firstly,
expression (29) and (30) are substituted in W1. The government of region 1 then optimizes
with s1 as choice variable, taking N32 as given. The outcome is the optimal commuting tax s1
as a function of N32. Next, replacing this tax in the expression above results in the reaction
function (31) (and (32) for region 3). Now impose symmetry, i.e. region 1 and 3 are identical.
Finally, substituting the solution NCournot
32 in the expression for s1, the Cournot outcome for
the commuting tax is obtained.
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